The
English term science was derived from the Latin scientia meaning
knowledge
or "to know." In The Oxford English
Dictionary one encounters multiple early meanings of science
and its equivalent in several languages. The term was sometimes
employed to celebrate the science (knowledge) and wisdom of
God and to distinguish between true knowledge and opinion.
The word Science was also used to portray the idea of firm
truths based on an understanding of cause and effect. In the
Medieval Period, the term science was often used to refer to
a particular branch of knowledge. The seven liberal sciences,
also referred to as the seven liberal arts, consisted of the
trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) and the quadriviam (arithmetic,
geometry, astronomy, and music). Pejorative meanings of the
word science are also encountered throughout history in claims
that abstractions, complex formulas, and pompously complex
language sometimes serve only to obfuscate or to confuse. The
word scientist, referring to one with expertise in one of the
sciences or with special methodological skills, was not used
until the 19th century.
The meanings of the term science, as we know the term
at the outset of the 21st century, did not
come about quickly as the result of a sudden
breakthrough
or insight. Indeed, intellectual precursors of science are found in ancient
times and in all periods of history, but there were developments, especially
in the Renaissance and early modern period (from 1600), that are particularly
important to the substantive and methodological characteristics of science,
as it is currently understood. In this article, I review four intellectual
precursors that contributed to the development of science and that continue
to characterize and define basic contemporary scientific attitudes. Following
that background I turn to a discussion of contemporary meanings of science.
Intellectual Precursors of the Scientific Spirit
As noted, the word science in early usage was often associated with
what was regarded as true knowledge. Such “true knowledge” might have been
based on authority or on a valid deductive argument marked by appropriate application
of the rules of logic. Thus, in early usage, the term science did not convey
the idea of knowledge based on controlled experimental methods. Evolving new
meanings however, gradually surfaced in the work of luminaries such as Galileo
Galilei, Isaac Newton, Francis Bacon, and René Descartes. Bacon and
Descartes in particular hoped to hammer out a conception of science based on
methodological considerations. That is, they hoped to clearly articulate and
clarify the unique intellectual processes that were leading to the ground-breaking
discoveries surfacing in the name of science in the 17th Century. Thus, Bacon
and Descartes stand at the threshold of the modern period as important early
philosophers of science. Their work contributed to the idea that science is
more than a systematized body of knowledge; it is a way of knowing based on
specific assumptions and methodological procedures that guide the intellectual
process. Bacon and Descartes clearly tied science to what later was known as
epistemology, that special branch of philosophy that studies the problems of
human knowledge and the conditions and methods used to assess truth. They also
understood that certain long held attitudes, specifically attitudes toward
authority, tradition, curiosity, skepticism, and naturalism stood in the way
of the development of a scientific age. A key to understanding the nature of
science hinges partly on an awareness of the evolution of curiosity, skepticism,
naturalism, and what I will call "eschewing first things." A
brief exploration of each of these topics is warranted.
Curiosity
For centuries, curiosity was widely regarded as a mark of vanity,
an intellectual vice, a dangerous sin, evidence of foolish pride, and
an affront to God. Curiosity represented a lack of obedience and was
sometimes
blamed
for "the fall of human beings" in the Garden of Eden. The fear
of curiosity is illustrated in lines from Robert Browning (2007, p.147)
in his
poem "A Woman's Last Word."
Where the apple reddens,
Never pry --
Lest we lose our Edens,
Eve and I
Lines from John Milton (1979, book 8, p. 205) in his Paradise Lost convey
an attitude that persisted for centuries.
Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid,
Leave them to God above, him serve and fear.
Umberto Eco, (1980) in his novel "The Name of the Rose" captures
a common attitude in the Medieval Period when a young novitiate confesses to
an older monk that he is troubled by "the yearnings of the mind, which
wants to know too many things." The predictable reply is "And that
is bad. The Lord knows all things, and we must only adore his knowledge" (p.
221).
In a thoughtful article on the history of curiosity, Harrison (2001) pointed
out that Francis Bacon realized that curiosity must be enfranchised and
become a necessary component of the scientific spirit. But how could Bacon
possibly
combat centuries of deeply embedded religious criticism of curiosity? Harrison
pointed out that Bacon employed a clever tactic by first joining the ranks
of those who were critical of curiosity. Yes, curiosity could indeed lead
to self-centered arrogance, pride, obsession with trivial matters and conceit.
On the other hand, the world, after all, was God's creation and a better
understanding
of that creation could feed Christian charity by the development of new
knowledge that would bring comfort to the sick, the poor, and the disadvantaged.
Bacon
was saying that curiosity is not necessarily a sin, rather put to the proper
use, it could be a vehicle for good works. Bacon's appreciation for the
benefits of curiosity was strongly echoed by other 17th and 18th century
philosophers
so in time, what had been a vice would become a virtue. Curiosity is a
virtue vital to all modern thought and specifically to the modern development
of the
scientific spirit. The suppression of curiosity enfeebles all intellectual
processes, but is especially injurious to the scientific spirit.
Skepticism
The skeptical school of thought initiated by Pyrrho (c. 360
- c. 270 B.C.E.) was resurrected in the 16th century by Michel de Montaigne
(1533-1592).
In his famous essay, Apology for Raimond Sebond, Montaigne
launched a powerful attack on all human knowledge (Montaine, 1960).
Motivated
by his disgust
with Protestant-Catholic wars, Montaigne launched a trenchant attack
on the
ignorance,
blind certitude, presumption, and arrogance that serve as underpinnings
for war and other outrageous behaviors. He argued that Virtue should
be the product
of genuine knowledge and such knowledge would include a deep awareness
of the shaky grounds of all our human pretensions. Montaigne hung a
little sign
by
his desk "What do I know?" The answer, for all who are honest
-- not much!
Montaigne attacked knowledge claims based on authority, tradition,
and revelation as well as claims associated with reason and science.
Nothing
was sparred.
Scientific claims change with time, reason can be flawed, emotion tinctures
all of our cognitive structures, our senses may not mirror external
reality, authorities, no matter how they have been revered, have been
proven wrong
over and over again. In short, we are all beggars in matters of knowledge
and the
world would be much better off if humility could somehow replace arrogance
and certitude. In an age of bloodshed resulting from religious wars,
Montaigne's skepticism captured the public imagination. His skepticism
was so compelling
that, in the words of Durant and Durant (1961), “His influence pervaded
three centuries and four continents" (p. 413). Following his work,
the merits of a skeptical attitude could be juxtaposed with the folly
of the
blind certitude that had motivated religious violence. Following Montaigne,
early
philosophers of science explicitly recognized the value of skepticism
and doubt as pivotal values in scientific methodology. Both Descartes
and Bacon
acknowledged
the influence of Montaigne on their work and both men believed that
a skeptical doubting attitude was an important characteristic of scientific
work. Thus
skepticism, once viewed as a moral weakness, was gradually elevated
as
an intellectual and moral virtue.
Naturalism
Naturalism includes the belief that causal forces are inherent
in nature itself and produce effects without the intervention of any
paranormal or supernatural powers. One way to understand naturalism
is to explore
some of the things it rejects. One of the first things it rejects is
illustrated in the works of Al-Ghazali, a prominent and respected 12th
century Islamic
scholar and mystic. Al-Ghazali argued that cause and effect as natural
concepts
are created by human beings (see Rubenstein, 2003, p. 85). Al Ghazali
illustrated by noting that any two things, such as “the quenching of thirst and
drinking, satiety and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and
the appearance
of the sun . . . [are connected] due the prior decree of God, who creates
them side by side” (see Al-Ghazali, 2000, p. 166). According
to Al Ghazali there is nothing inherent, no power, no causal force,
in water per se apart
from the action of deity that quenches thirst. There is nothing intrinsic
in one magnet that results in the attraction or the repulsion of another;
nothing
intrinsic in fire per se that could produce a burn. All the
things that happen in the natural world, all the unimaginable trillions
of events (no
matter how
small or large) taking place in a given instant reside in deity alone
and not in any power that resides in nature by itself. Such a philosophy,
taken
literally,
undercuts the motivation to explore nature in its own right. Prior
to Al-Ghazali there had been important advances in science and philosophy
in the Islamic
world illustrated in the works of scholars such as Avicenna, Rhazes,
and Alhazen. The work of Al-Ghazali, however, marks an unfortunate
turning
point in Islamic
science. In the words of Watt (1965) following Al-Ghazali "there are
no further great names in the philosophical movement in the Islamic east" (p.
1041).
Naturalistic philosophers strongly reject beliefs such as those encountered
in the work of Al Ghazali partly because such beliefs are counterintuitive
and partly because they can have such a smothering effect on scientific
inquiry. Furthermore, Al Ghazali's contention that all causality resides
in the action
of deity alone comes along with very difficult problems such as how to
account for all the brokenness, misdirection, and evil in the world. All
events, according
to the extreme anti-naturalism of Al-Ghazali, must somehow revert back
to God, so our chief intellectual work must be theological rather than
scientific.
Over time, Al Ghazali became more and more of a recluse and a mystic contemplating
the inscrutable nature of his God and fatalistically resigning himself
to the course of events in a world fordone by the incomprehensible decrees
of God.
Non-natural or supernatural forces have historically been construed anthropomorphically
as benevolent or malevolent. Fear of malevolent forces is evident in many
religious traditions and is graphically present in the religious traditions
of Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. In each tradition, the malevolent work of the
devil or devils is illustrated in parables and in stories that were sometimes
intended
as historical narratives of actual events. Though demonological explanations
are ubiquitous throughout history, they reached an apogee in the Christian
world in the 16th and 17th centuries. In their classic book, The Malleus
Maleficarum (translated as "The Witches Hammer or the Hammer Against Witches")
Dominican monks Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger (1971) outline the
kinds of things devils and their disciples can do and how they do them
(pp. 89-193).
Among other things, Devils and their cohorts can cause hailstorms and
all kinds of other tempests, infect animals with diseases, destroy
crops, cause
miscarriages,
interfere with all reproductive capacities, kill babies, have sexual
intercourse with humans, or cause any physical or psychological malady.
In the 16th and 17th centuries naturalistic philosophers, physicians, and
scientists initiated strong arguments against demonological explanations
of events that
could more profitably be construed in naturalistic terms. It was argued
that demonological explanations are unnecessarily complicated, filled with
post
hoc theory-saving additions, and lack demonstrable predictive and heuristic
value. Such objections are illustrated in a book titled Physics for
the Inquiring Mind by Eric Rogers (1960) who asks that you imagine yourself
to be in a conversation
on the subject of friction with Faustus who speaks for devils. Faustus
argues that invisible devils push against an object such as a brick and
it is the
perfect counter action of devils that is the cause of friction when you
attempt to push the brick across a surface. You might inform Faustus that
friction
is decreased if oil is placed on the surface over which the brick is to
be pushed. Faustus is not so easily defeated because he declares that oil
drowns
the demons and that is why friction is decreased. Rogers cleverly leads
the reader through several simple scenarios designed to defeat Faustus
and his
demonological explanations, but in each scenario Faustus is able to come
up with a post hoc but complicated explanation of why it is that demons
are the
real cause of friction. For example, rough surfaces are generally associated
with greater friction than smooth surfaces. Faustus declares that is because
demons live in the pores of surfaces and there are more pores in rough
than smooth surfaces, hence more demons. Though Faustus appears to be able
to come
up with post hoc saving demonological explanations for friction phenomena,
his explanations quickly begin to stretch credulity. The naturalist can
provide much simpler and more productive explanations than those offered
by Faustus.
Naturalists and possibly the public at large were also motivated by
the excesses resulting from what Carl Sagan (1996) called “The Demon-Haunted World.” Beliefs
in demons came with tragic moral consequences as tens of thousands, mainly
women, were tried for witchcraft and brutally tortured or sentenced to death,
usually by burning or hanging. The work of philosophers such as René Descartes
and Benedict Spinoza and physicians such as Johann Weyer (1515-1588)
contributed to the demise of demonology. Weyer argued that many who
were accused of
witchcraft were deranged and that their behavior could be explained
naturalistically. Descartes found no place for demons in his attempts
to understand the
relationships between brain processes and behavior. Spinoza boldly
denied the existence
of demons.
Though demons and other paranormal forces were gradually replaced by naturalistic
perspectives in the physical, chemical, biological, and engineering sciences,
large segments of the American population continue to believe in demonic
forces as explanations for selected emotional and behavioral disorders.
A Harris poll
reported by Stoddard (2007) showed that more Americans (62%) believe in
the devil than in Darwin (42%). Fear of demons and demonic forces is also
illustrated
in the apparent growth of exorcism as a treatment for some emotional and
behavioral disorders (see Euteneuer, 2010). Belief in demons is a continuing
source of
tension between certain traditional selected faith communities and standard
contemporary scientific approaches to disordered behaviors as practiced
by psychiatrists, neuroscientists, and psychologists.
Eschewing First Things
A final precursor of the scientific spirit is illustrated in the capacity
to recognize and suspend preconceptions and favored hypotheses and theories.
Intellectual
inquiry, from a scientific standpoint, is hopelessly corrupted if we know
at the outset of an investigation that there are special ideologies that
will
inevitably be confirmed or words of authority that cannot possibly be doubted
or contradicted. William James, in his classic Pragmatism,
refers to an "attitude
of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities;
and looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts" (James,
1907/1943, pp. 54-55). James is adamant in rejecting "fixed principles,
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins." "Looking
away from first things" means that the observational task is to allow
the empirical flow of events to lead where they will without necessarily
affirming
those
things we think we know beforehand. Scientific investigations have all too
often resulted in data that have run contrary to every reasonable expectation,
theory, or hypothesis. History
provides abundant examples of the disproof of things we once knew "with
certainty." An
immobile earth, a sun that orbits the earth, and light that always moves
in a straight line were “first things” that had to be abandoned
in the face of overwhelming contradictory scientific evidence. Who could
have
predicted that we would someday be able to “look through” flesh
to identify underlying skeletal structures? There were also moral "first
things" including the belief that, in all things, women were intellectually
inferior to men and that slavery, as an institution, had a moral or even
a religious basis. Throughout history, human beings have been willing to
die
and kill for "first things." The capacity to eschew "first
things" amounts
to nothing less than an empirical openness that leads to a deep appreciation
for the complicated, effusive, novel, and serendipitous qualities that
reside everywhere in the natural world.
Science at the Outset of the 21st Century
Curiosity, skepticism, naturalism, and the capacity to eschew first
things are all precursors of the scientific spirit, but also remain
integral
to contemporary scientific thinking and practice. If these precursors
remain
as enduring values,
many other things have changed. Francis Bacon observed "the art of discovery
may advance as discoveries advance" (Bacon, 1620/1960, p. 120). His words
were prophetic as there has been a continuing proliferation of new instruments,
statistical and mathematical methods, technical developments, theories, and
models that alter and shape the way scientists think and practice. Bacon realized
that science would be a dynamic ever-changing enterprise in contrast with the
static and stale ways of thinking that have marked some periods of history.
The dynamic nature of science has led historian of science Stephen G. Brush
(1974) to ask, somewhat humorously but very thoughtfully, whether the History
of Science should be rated X? Brush shows that history may be subversive because
it will inevitably challenge fixed or idealized notions of science. Brush demonstrates
that students of history will inevitably learn that scientists have used a
variety of methods and have often solved problems in unorthodox ways. Paul
Feyerabend, a philosopher of science, argued that "The idea of a method
that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting
the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with
the results of historical research -- there is not a single rule, however plausible,
and however grounded in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or
other" (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 23). Joel Hildebrand, a former president
of the American Chemical Association, has questioned the idea that
there is one scientific method (Hildebrand, 1957). Echoing
the same sentiment, Nobel Prize winner, P. B. Medawar argued "There is indeed no such thing as 'the'
scientific method" (Medawar, 1984, p. 51). The methods of field
biologists or astronomers, for example, appear to be different from
the methods of
wet-lab chemists or experimental psychologists who manipulate variables
in the laboratory.
Science is often conceived in terms of its content, but it should also
be conceived as an attitude and as a set of ever evolving methodologies.
The scientific
attitude is one of epistemic humility motivated by skepticism and by the
knowledge that the procedures and results of a scientific study are sure
to be checked
in the laboratory or field by other scientists. Epistemic humility is the
capacity to forego certitude and to allow events to run their course without
having
to affirm what we thought we knew beforehand. Though scientific methodologies
have mutated and proliferated there is nevertheless some degree of consensus
as to what counts as canonical scientific practice in given time periods.
At a minimum, contemporary science involves an open and disciplined structuring
of observational tasks. An open structuring refers to the public nature
of
science wherein all observational procedures and conditions are communicated
in a manner so explicit and clear that other scientists can replicate them.
Repeated failure to replicate the results of a study is the kiss of death
in science. There are, of course, one-time events such as a close encounter
with
a meteor or a comet, but even in such events, scientific observational
procedures and conditions are explicit and the data collected in one observatory
are cross
checked with data in other observatories.
Science, as it is now understood, is marked by a bewildering array
of new technologies, methods and models that could not have been anticipated
in
earlier periods.
Particle accelerators, a variety of new imaging techniques, space telescopes,
refrigerated centrifuges, double-blind methods, nanotechnologies including
molecular self-assemblies, statistical meta-analysis and a great host
of other new tools and methods are now an everyday part of an ever
growing
scientific arsenal. Bacon was indeed prophetic when he said that “the
art of discover may advance as discoveries advance.”
Some Values of Science
Scientific methodology includes a built in method for settling disputes
that is sadly missing in other ways of knowing. This is one reason science
is there
for everybody regardless of religion, nationality, race, or political affiliation.
Expressions such as Arian physics, Christian biology, or Muslim chemistry,
reflect profound misunderstandings of the vertical qualities of scientific
methodologies that stubbornly refuse to be contained or captured by the
limiting boundaries of religious, political, or national ideologies. One
of the most
important virtues of science, borrowed from philosophy, is encountered
in its self-critical or meta-theoretical endeavors. From its inception
in modern history,
there has been a respected place for intellectual work in the philosophy
of science as an independent and valued disciplinary activity. For all
of its
gifts to humankind, we have yet to realize the freedom, integrity, honesty,
openness, love of knowledge, and beauty in the scientific enterprise.
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